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DEMOCRACY, ANTI-DEMOCRACY, AND 
THE CANON 
Richard H. Pi/des* 
Democracy is the Banquo's ghost of American constitution-
alism. Appearing evanescently in vague discussions of process-
based theories of judicial review, or in isolated First Amendment 
cases involving political speech, or in momentary Equal Protec-
tion forays into racial redistricting, democracy hovers insistently 
over the constitutional canon. Yet democracy itself has not been 
brought onto center stage. From the background, democracy's 
obligations press upon the canon's principal players-rights, 
equality, separation of powers, federalism. We endlessly debate 
which issues should be left to "democratic bodies" and which to 
judicial review, but with little concern for the prior question of 
how the law ought to structure the institutions and ground rules 
of democracy itself. In the conventional constitutional canon, 
democracy is nearly absent as a systematic focus of study in its 
own right. If campaign financing is addressed, it is in narrow 
First Amendment terms of whether "money is speech"-not as 
part of the broader inquiry necessarily at stake concerning the 
role of political parties, individual candidates, and "independ-
ent" ideological and economic groups in a healthy democracy. If 
racial redistricting is presented, it is as one more variant of af-
firmative action-not in the context of competing conceptions of 
the aims of political representation, or of the general tension be-
tween minority interests and majoritarian politics, or of the his-
tory of the secret ballot, 1 literacy tests, poll taxes, and vote dilu-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Visiting Professor of 
Law, NYU Law School. My assessment of Giles has been greatly influenced by conver· 
sations with Rebecca Scott and Sam Issacharoff; this draft further benefitted from excep-
tionally detailed comments from J. Morgan Kousser and Adam Winkler, as well as the 
insightful readings of Rick Hills, Larry Kramer, Derrick Bell, Michael Klarman, Daryl 
Levinson, and Barry Friedman. I am grateful to Marita Etcubanez, for a student paper 
that introduced me to the historical resources involving Booker T. Washington and to 
Michael Sant'Ambrogio for research assistance. 
1. Yes, the secret ballot, which was the subject of intense political struggle in the 
South and seems there to have been adopted "primarily to purge the electorate of illiter-
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tion, as well as the policies and current Department of Justice 
enforcement practices under the Voting Rights Act. If the con-
stitutional right to vote is noted, it is only as one example of the 
fundamental rights strand of Equal Protection law (along with, 
perhaps, the right to travel or access to the judicial system)-but 
not as an opening into what institutional configurations of 
democratic bodies, with what voting electorates, might be best 
for the myriad functions government now performs.2 
If sustained attention to democracy itself has been star-
tlingly absent from the constitutional canon, so too has its an-
tithesis: the history in American politics and constitutional law of 
anti-democracy. For constitutional law played a role in sustain-
ing the blatant manipulations of political institutions that kept 
America from fully becoming a democracy before 1965.3 Recov-
ering this history of the Supreme Court's removal of democracy 
from the agenda of constitutional law, for most of the 20th cen-
tury, is one way of bringing democracy to constitutional thought 
today. In this bleak and unfamiliar saga, there is one key mo-
ment, one decisive turning point: the 1903 opinion of Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Giles v. Harris.4 If canonization re-
quires a ready focal point, this is it for (anti-)democracy in 
American constitutional law. By bringing Giles into the consti-
tutional corpus, we can begin to put democracy itself at the core 
of constitutional thought, where it belongs. 
ates." In fact, the secret ballot did produce sharp declines in voter turnout, particularly 
among black voters. J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage, Re-
striction, and the Establishment of the One-Pany South, 1880-1910 at 53-56 (Yale U. 
Press, 1974) ("Southern Politics"). 
2. Even the pathbreaking John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review (Harvard U. Press, 1980), employs "democracy" in a thin and instrumen-
tal way, as a means of justifying certain judicial interventions, without offering a robust, 
substantive account of how democracy ought to be structured and conceived. For the 
now classic statement of this critique, see generally Richard Davies Parker, The Past of 
Constitutional Theory-And 1ts Future, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 223 (1981). And with the em-
phasis on rights and equality that has dominated constitutional writing since then, of 
which Ronald Dworkin's work is perhaps most emblematic, democracy has receded even 
further into the background of the contemporary canon. 
3. Writing from the vantage point of 1935 about the post-Reconstruction disfran-
chisement of black voters, W.E.B. Du-Bois said: "In no other civilized and modem land 
has so great a group of people, most of whom were able to read and write, been allowed 
so small a voice in their own government." W.E.B. Du-Bois, Black Reconstruction in 
America 694 (Atheneum, 1992). That remained true until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
In Mississippi, the black voter registration level was 6.7% on the eve of the Act's passage. 
See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1360 (1995). 
4. 189 u.s. 475 (1903). 
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I 
Giles has been airbrushed out of the constitutional canon. 
It is surely one of the most momentous decisions in United 
States Supreme Court history and one of the most revealing. 
Yet, as far as I can tell, it receives nat;' a mention in four of the 
leading Constitutional Law casebooks. A fifth, the most histori-
cally oriented, notices the case but in an uncharacteristically le-
galistic footnote that hardly conveys the stakes.6 Professor 
Tribe's magisterial treatise does not cite it.7 Giles permits the 
virtual elimination of black citizens from political participation 
in the South. Yet while extensive attention is devoted to judicial 
validation of separate but equal segregation, none is devoted to 
this. Every law student knows of Plessy v. Ferguson;8 virtually 
none know of Giles. Many well-established constitutional schol-
ars I have spoken with have not heard of the case.9 Even among 
some academics seeking to make race a more central feature of 
the constitutional canon, the momentous case and context are 
not known.10 This is not surprising, for it merely confirms how 
powerful canonization, or its absence, can be. Even the Soviets 
5. See Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and PhilipP. Frickey, Constitu· 
tional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century (West, 2d ed. 1998); Gerald 
Gunther and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 13th ed. 
1997); William B. Lockhart, Yale Karnisar, Jesse H. Choper, Steven H. Shiffrin, and 
Richard H. Fallon, Constitutional Law Cases-Comments-Questions, American Casebook 
Series (West, 8th ed. 1996); Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and 
Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law (Aspen, 3d ed. 1996). For a revealing history of 
how the Dowling-Gunther-Sullivan casebook has treated issues of democracy from 1937 
on, see generally Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law, the Political Process, and the 
Bondage of Discipline, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1185 (1999). 
6. See Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decision-
making Cases and Materials 253 n.30 (Little, Brown and Co., 3d ed. 1992) (describing 
holding as that an action in equity could not be maintained to require supervision of 
voting in Montgomery County). The forthcoming next edition does provide a one-
paragraph textual discussion of Giles, which must be considered a breakthrough of sorts. 
7. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 
1988), and Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law, (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 
2000). I am relying on the table of cases to these volumes. 
8. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
9. The case is appreciated appropriately in Owen Fiss's contribution to the 
Holmes Devise. Owen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Coun of the United States: The 
Troubled Beginnings of the Modem State, 1888-1910 at 373 (Macmillan, 1971). 
10. Without meaning this to be critical, I have in mind here as exemplary Fran An-
sley's recent essay, Recognizing Race in the American Legal Canon, inS. Levinson, ed., 
(forthcoming). The case is discussed in Derrick Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law 
45-46, 112, 177, 189 n.l4 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1992), Bell views Holmes' political 
judgment about the limits of the Court's power as "the truth." 
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could admire this success at obscuring all traces of a prior politi-
cal regime.11 
Yet historically, the context of Giles is as dramatic as any in 
American political and constitutional history. u Jurispruden-
tially, the opinion weds legalism with realpolitik into one of the 
most fascinatingly repellant analyses in the Court's history. And 
doctrinally, the reverberations of Giles resound throughout the 
century; for notwithstanding the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, Giles carves out from them the category of "po-
litical rights" and holds such rights unenforceable.13 And so they 
were, until Baker v. Carr,14 sixty years later, with Giles enlisted 
by Justices like Felix Frankfurter in support of constitutional 
law's insistence that democracy remain off stage.15 
11. This erasure was literally true in some contexts. Thus, the official compiler in 
Georgia of the state's legislative manual, decided after Reconstruction ended to omit 
black lawmakers from the biographical sketches in the volume. It would be absurd, he 
wrote, to record "the lives of men who were but yesterday our slaves, and whose past 
careers, probably, embraced such menial occupations as boot-blacking, shaving, table-
waiting, and the like." See Eric Foner, Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Of-
ficeholders During Reconstruction xii (Louisiana State U. Press, rev. ed. 1966). 
12. In the odd context of an appeal from a murder conviction, the disfranchising 
provisions of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution had been brought to the Court in Wil-
liams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). Because jurors had to be qualified electors, a 
black defendant challenged his conviction by an all-white jury on the ground that the suf-
frage provisions in the new state constitution violated the federal Constitution. The 
Court took this as a facial challenge to the provisions and rejected them in not nearly as 
direct a confrontation with the issue of disfranchisement as Giles soon posed. Disfran-
chising politicians did not see Williams as the carte blanche that Giles would soon offer; 
on the contrary, WiUiams suggested that the litigation had failed for want of proof of ra-
cially-discriminatory effects. Disfranchisers feared that Williams implied that adequate 
proof of such effects would make the emerging Southern electoral laws and administra-
tive practices unconstitutional. See J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice 322 (U. of 
North Carolina Press, 1999). Williams' lawyer, Cornelius J. Jones, was also pursuing 
congressional relief against Mississippi's 1890 Constitution by asking Congress to unseat 
representatives elected under that Constitution. ld. at 321. 
13. Lest this sound familiar, Giles does not involve the republican form of govern-
ment clause nor does it cite Luther v. Borden for its holding. 
14. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
15. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., an-
nouncing the judgment of the Court) (plurality opinion) (citing Giles). The Court did 
hold unconstitutional the grandfather clauses, which exempted from newly-imposed suf-
frage restrictions, for example, those eligible to vote as of 1866 and their lineal descen-
dants. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). But even their proponents thought 
these clauses almost transparently unconstitutional; in this context, the Court was in 
alignment with the national executive branch, which prosecuted the action; the Court 
could invalidate these clauses based on "the mere statement of the text" itself, id. at 364, 
which proclaimed its racially discriminatory purpose, rather than having to address an as-
applied challenge or a fact-based claim of discriminatory administration; and perhaps 
most importantly, the Court could invalidate these provisions on their face without hav-
ing to monitor actual registration processes (as a practical matter, Guinn's principal ef-
fect was not to enfranchise black voters, but to extend the disfranchisement of white vot-
ers who could not otherwise comply with the new suffrage restrictions). In addition, the 
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II 
Consider, first, the historical context that brought before 
the Supreme Court Jackson Giles, a literate black man andRe-
publican-party activist in a federal patronage job employed as 
the janitor in Montgomery, Alabama's federal courthouse.16 
Giles was President of an organization called the Colored Men's 
Suffrage Association; he had registered and voted in Montgom-
ery from 1871 to 1901. In the aftermath of the Civil War, black 
suffrage had been "the most radical element of Congressional 
Reconstruction. "17 With the passage of the Reconstruction Acts 
of 1867, the meaning of emancipation came to include-cru-
cially-political participation and the democratization of Amer-
ica. The Acts required the defeated Southern States to adopt 
new constitutions, acceptable to Congress, as a condition for re-
entry to the Union. The Acts also required that eligibility to 
vote for delegates to these State constitutional conventions not 
be denied "by reason of race or color," and that the resulting 
constitutions guarantee racially non-discriminatory suffrage. 
The result was that in the next elections, nearly half the voters in 
the South were black; indeed, black voters at that moment con-
Court struck down the whites-only primary in a quadrology of cases from Texas spanning 
26 years, commencing with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), and concluding with 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). These were more significant decisions, though their 
practical effect was mostly to force Southern white-primary states toward more aggres-
sive use of previous restrictions that had lain dormant for years, such as literacy tests, but 
here too the Court could resolve the issue on the face of the relevant provisions-in 
Herndon, Texas law provided that "in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in 
a Democratic party primary" -and hold those provisions unconstitutional, without any 
need for more extensive judicial oversight. And in some states, such as Mississippi, the 
legislature then mandated that voters could vote in party primaries only if they were "in 
accord with" party principles; the State Democratic Party executive committee then de-
fined those principles to include opposition to federal antilynching laws, anti-poll tax 
laws, and the Fair Employment Practices Commission. John Ditmer, Local People: The 
Struggle For Civil Rights in Mississippi 26 (U. of Illinois Press, 1994). With respect to the 
continuing influence of Giles, the Nixon opinion expressed an obligation to distinguish 
Giles, and while the latter was not mentioned in Guinn, the Court did feel obligated in 
the follow-up case to Guinn also to distinguish Giles. See generally Lane v. Wilson, 307 
U.S. 268 (1939). Justice Frankfurter, who wrote Lane, then drew on Giles a few years 
later in Colegrove to help justify keeping federal courts out of the truly major challenge 
to frozen democratic structures that the malapportionrnent cases raised. 
16. See Kousser, Colorblind Injustice at 322 (cited in note 12). Federal employment 
might have insulated Giles somewhat from economic pressure and enabled him to serve 
as plaintiff in a series of cases. For an eye-opening account of the totalistic and brutally 
successful economic warfare later waged on similar black activists in Mississippi who 
sought to vote or to enforce Brown v. Board of Education, see the Bancroft Prize-
winning book, Dittmer, Local People 41-50 (cited in note 15). 
17. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 at 278 
(Harper & Row, 1988). 
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stituted a majority of the electorate in states like Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina (initially, 
thousands of whites were ineligible because of their roles in the 
Confederacy while other whites refused to participate).18 Eco-
nomic intimidation was rampant and often immediate; in Giles' 
home town, for example, an employer noticed one of his labor-
ers in line to vote and fired him on the spot.19 Yet black voter 
turnout was stunningly high, approaching 90 percent in many 
elections.20 As Eric Foner puts it, "[r]arely has a community in-
vested so many hopes in politics as did blacks during Radical 
Reconstruction. "21 Jackson Giles apparently shared in that hope. 
The Fifteenth Amendment, adopted in 1870, gave these hopes 
constitutional expression and, no doubt Giles thought, constitu-
tional security. 
Black (male) political participation remained extraordinary 
high long after federal military forces were withdrawn from the 
South in 1877. In 1880, two-thirds of adult black men voted in 
the Presidential election; even in the 1890s, half of black men 
still voted in key governor's races in Southern states.22 Black of-
ficials also held political offices (around 2,000 in number) at 
every level in the South, from state Supreme Courts, to the U.S. 
Senate, down to the county and locallevel.23 Indeed, the number 
18. See Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 546 
(Knopf, 1979). Amnesty bills were soon adopted, and Alabama and Aorida did not long 
retain statewide majority-black electorates. But in Mississippi, for example, on the eve of 
the 1890 Constitutional Convention, there were 189,884 registered black voters com-
pared to 118,890 registered whites. See Morton Stavis, A Century of Struggle For Black 
Enfranchisement in Mississippi: From the Civil War to the Congressional Challenge of 
1965-and Beyond, 57 Miss. L.J. 591, 603 (1987). By 1892, only 68,127 white voters 
qualified as eligible and a mere 8,615 black voters. Id. at 605. 
19. See id. at 556. 
20. Foner, Reconstruction at 291 (cited in note 17). 
21. ld. 
22. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in 
Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: The 
Voting Rights Act in Perspective 135, 141 (Brookings, 1992) ("The Voting Rights Act"). 
As late as 1898, black-white political coalitions controlled electoral outcomes in places 
like Grimes County, Texas. See Lawrence C. Goodwyn, Populist Dreams and Negro 
Rights: East Texas as a Case Study, 76 Am. Hist. Rev. 1435, 1439-43 (1971). 
23. See Foner, Reconstruction at 537-39 (cited in note 17); see also Foner, Free-
dom's Lawmakers xi (cited in note 11). It is no accident that Fort Bend County, Texas 
was home to the Jaybird Association, the all-white, private political organization eventu-
ally to be held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461 (1953). From 1868-1888, blacks outnumbered whites four to one in the 
county, and black officials held numerous political offices. See Darlene Oark Hine, 
Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas 33-34 (KTO Press, 1979). 
The Jaybirds arose as the private organizational arm of white supremacy's political re-
turn to Fort Bend. 
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of Southern black legislators elected in 1872 was not matched 
again until the 1990s (in the wake of Thornburg v. Gingles24), 
and, though black officeholding declined sharply by 1880, even 
that much-reduced number was not a9sain reached until 1972, 
seven years after the Voting Rights Act. 
Yet the forces of elite, conservative, white political control, 
through the organized vehicle of the Democratic Party, slowly 
recovered political power through a series of increasingly effec-
tive tactics: outright violence and intimidation, including in the 
worst single day of carnage, the massacre of at least 105 surren-
dering blacks at the courthouse in Colfax, Louisiana26 (the focus 
of initially successful federal prosecutions soon overturned in 
United States v. Cruikshan/('); fraudulent manipulation of bal-
lots; racial gerrymandering of election districts and other dilutive 
structural devices; and statutory suffrage restrictions that greatly 
reduced the black and poor-white electorate. For those who 
mistakenly believe in the inevitability of white supremacy in this 
period, the key word here is "slowly"; it took several years of the 
self-conscious construction and organized mobilization of a mili-
tarized white supremacy, often against a divided white business 
community willing to accommodate black political participation 
for the sake of stability, to enable white "redemption" of the 
South.28 This step-by-step process eventually culminated in suf-
ficient white control to produce new constitutional conventions, 
or suffrage-restricting constitutional amendments through refer-
enda, in every former Confederate state, starting with Missis-
sippi in 1890 and ending with Georgia in 1908.29 The avowed 
purpose of these new constitutions was to restore white suprem-
24. 478 u.s. 30 (1986). 
25. These figures are put together for the first time in Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 
at 19 (cited in note 12), and they involve blacks elected to Southern state legislatures or 
the United States Congress. 
26. Described in horrifying detail in Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction: War, 
Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 at 173-218 (Louisiana State U. Press, 
1984). 
27. 92 u.s. 542 (1875). 
28. The specific details of this process are vividly portrayed for New Orleans in 
Lawrence N. Powell, "The Battle of Canal Street: An Upper-Oass Dream of Power and 
Preferment," presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Histori-
ans, Toronto, Canada, April25, 1999 (draft on file with author). 
29. The relevant dates are Mississippi, 1890 (convention); South Carolina, 1895 
(convention); Louisiana, 1898 (convention); North Carolina, 1900 (amendment); Ala-
b~a. 1901 (convention); Virginia, 1902 (convention); Texas, 1902 (amendment); Geor-
gia, 1908 (amendment). Constitutional disfranchisement was the capstone to the elimi-
nation of black political participation, and while it was preceded and facilitated by earlier 
statutory and other disfranchisement techniques, it cast disfranchisement into the most 
endurable and symbolically significant legal form. 
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acy, but that was not their only aim. For the Framers of disfran-
chisement were typically the most conservative, large landown-
ing, wealthy faction of the Democratic Party, who were also 
seeking to entrench their partisan power and fend off challenges 
from Republicans, Populists, and other third parties, as well as 
from the more populist wings of the Democratic Party. While 
pledging not to disfranchise any whites, they advocated provi-
sions that would remove the less educated, less organized, more 
impoverished whites from the electorate as well-and that would 
ensure one-party, Democratic rule, which is precisely what hap-
pened from this moment forward through most of the 20th cen-
tury in the South.30 
The white-supremacy purposes of these new constitutions 
were not disguised (though the concomitant aim of reducing 
populist white political influence was). As expressed by the 
President of the Alabama Convention whose handiwork Jackson 
Giles would soon challenge, '"what is it that we want to do? 
Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, 
to establish white supremacy in this State."'31 The resulting 1901 
constitution of Alabama offered "the most elaborate suffrage 
requirements that have ever been in force in the United 
States;"32 going on for pages, they "contained almost every quali-
fication for voting ever devised by the mind of man,"33 with the 
exception of a religious qualification: racially-gerrymandered 
criminal disfranchisement provisions, lengthy residency re-
30. Kousser's brilliant book documents this thesis in superb detail. See Kousser, 
Southern Politics at 238-265 (cited in note 1). Studies of individual states have concluded 
that, in some, more whites than blacks turned out to have been disfranchised after grand-
father provisions were eliminated or held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Malcolm Cook 
Mcmillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-1901: A Study in Politics, the 
Negro, and Sectionalism 357, 359 (U. of North Carolina Press reprint, 1978) ("Constitu-
tional requirements, which supposedly discriminated against 'Negro characteristics' 
rather than the Negro race, proved to be a web in which more whites than Negroes were 
caught."). 
31. Quoted in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985). The most brazen 
leader of black disfranchisement was South Carolina's United States Senator, Benjamin 
R. "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, who proclaimed on the floor of the U.S. Senate: "'We have 
done our level best. We have scratched our heads to find out how we could eliminate 
every last one of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed of 
it."' (quoted in Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofrnan, eds., Quiet Revolution in the 
South 194 (Princeton U. Press, 1994) ("Quiet Revolution")). 
32. Kirk H. Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States 213 (Greenwood 
Press, 1918). On the eve of the Voting Rights Act, only 19 percent of the black voting-
age population was registered in Alabama, compared to 69 percent of whites. As a result 
of the Act and popular mobilization, by 1967, a mere three years later, 52% of the black 
voting-age population was registered. Davidson and Grofman, Quiet Revolution at 38-39 
(cited in note 31). . 
33. Mcmillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama at 359 (cited in note 30). 
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quirements, a cumulative poll tax of $1.50, along with temporary 
clauses requiring good character but with grandfather provisions 
for ex-soldiers and their lineal descendants.34 This was particu-
larly ironic in Alabama, a state that had long had the most lib-
eral suffrage rules in the nation: universal white manhood suf-
frage since its admission in 1819 (along with the secret ballot, 
mandatory population-based apportionment in both houses 
every six years, relatively easy override of gubernatorial vetoes, 
and similarly populist provisions) and universal manhood suf-
frage since 1868.3 
The effect of these disenfranchising constitutions through-
out the South, combined with statutory suffrage restrictions, was 
immediate and devastating. In Louisiana, in 1896 there had 
been 130,334 black voters on the registration rolls and around 
the same number of white voters (the state's population was 
about 50 percent white and black); by 1900, two years after the 
new constitution, registered black voters numbered a mere 
5,320.36 By 1910, 730 registered black voters were left (less than 
0.5 percent of eligible black men). In 27 of the state's 60 par-
ishes, not a single black voter was registered any longer; in 9 
more parishes, only one black voter was. In South Carolina, 
black legislators had been the majority in the lower house during 
Reconstruction; ~ 1896, the entire state had only 5,500 black 
voters registered. In Alabama, in 1900 there were 181,471 eli-
gible black voters, but only 3,000 were registered after the new 
34. The Constitution had a bifurcated structure: before 1903, a temporary registra-
tion plan permitted registration for life, subject to compliance with residency, age, and 
poll-tax obligations, of (1) soldiers or sailors in various wars, including the Civil War, and 
their descendants, or (2) those of "good character" who "understood" the duties of citi-
zenship. After 1903, any registration had to take place under the full panoply of restric-
tions than then attached. 
35. J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860 
at 12-13 (Louisiana State U. Press, 1978); Mcmillan, Constitutional Development in Ala-
bama at 359 (cited in note 30). 
36. See John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom· A 
History of Negro Americans 237 (Knopf, 6th ed. 1988). These are official registration 
figures, which are considered inflated, probably to make ballot-box stuffing less visible; 
in some parishes, over 100% of the voting-age males were purportedly registered. See, 
e.g., Kousser, Southern Politics at 163 (cited in note 1) (recording white-male voter regis-
tration rate statewide at 103.2% on Jan. 1, 1897). Whatever the absolute registration fig-
ures, there is agreement that the post-suffrage restriction registration rates plummeted, 
with black registration virtually disappearing. Thus, Kousser reports the following data 
on percentages of Jan. 1: 1) 1896: 96.3% (w); 93.0% (b); 2) 1897: 103.2% (w); 95.6% (b); 
3) 1898:46.6% (w); 9.5% (b); 4) 1902:58.9% (w); 2.9% (b); 5) 1904: 52.5% (w); 1.1% (b). 
By 1898, new registration laws had gone into effect; by 1902, the new state constitution. 
Id. at 163. 
37. See Davidson and Grofman, Quiet Revolution at 192, 194 (cited in note 31). 
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constitutional provisions took effect.38 In Virginia, there was a 
100% drop-in other words, to zero-in estimated black voter 
turnout between the Presidential elections of 1900 and 1904.39 
North Carolina managed the same complete elimination of black 
voter turnout over an eight-year period, between the Presiden-
tial elections of 1896 and 1904.40 This was the legal situation 
Giles sought to challenge in the only way left, through constitu-
tional litigation. 
Where would the resources, the organizational support, and 
the professional expertise necessary to undertake litigation of 
this sort come from? Even these aspects of Giles are full of sur-
prise, for as historians discovered during the 1950s, the financing 
and representation for the Giles litigation was secretly arranged 
by none other than Booker T. Washington: the figure whose 
public persona exemplified, not confrontation, but accommoda-
tion to segregation and disfranchisement.41 Washington is best 
known for his 1895 Atlanta Compromise address, in which he 
became the leading black spokesperson for asserting that blacks 
should accept segregation and cease engaging in "political agita-
tion" if whites were willing to provide opportunities for eco-
nomic progress-the kind of progress Washington's vocational 
training school, the Tuskegee Institute, defined. These positions 
earned Washington access to major financial donors and enabled 
him to become the most politically influential black power bro-
ker the country had known. During disfranchisement, Washing-
ton favored property and educational restrictions, but pleaded 
with state constitutional conventions to apply them equally 
across races; yet when these conventions adopted "grandfather 
clauses" designed to maintain whites on the rolls, Washington 
refused in public to argue against ratification. While longtime 
black voters were being disenfranchised, Washington's home 
county in Alabama awarded him a lifetime voting certificate. 
Yet despite this carefully cultivated public mask of ingratia-
tion, behind the scenes Washington directed and raised funds for 
lawsuits that challenged Jim Crow: against railroad segregation, 
38. Franklin and Moss, From Slavery to Freedom at 237 (cited in note 36). See 
Mcmillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama at 352 (cited in note 30) (reporting 
that there were 181,315 registered black voters in 1900, 2,980 in 1903, and 3,742 in 1908). 
39. See Kousser, Southern Politics at 241 (cited in note 1). 
40. See id. 
41. The facts about Washington in these paragraphs were first presented by the 
great civil-rights scholar, August Meier, in Toward a Reinterpretation of Booker !· 
Washington, 23 J. So. History 220 (1957). A fuller treatment was then developed m 
Louis R. Harlan, The Secret Life of Booker T. Washington, 37 J. So. History 393 (1971). 
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exclusion of blacks from jury pools, and other state discrimina-
tory practices. Washington turns out to have been the principal 
mover behind the Giles litigation, after having failed first with 
disfranchisement litigation in Louisiana. Writing in code and 
swearing his contacts to secrecy lest his political viability with 
whites, including Northern contributors, be destroyed, Washing-
ton chose and paid for his friend and personal lawyer, Wilford 
H. Smith of New York City, to bring the Giles litigation. He had 
hoped that the local federal district judge, a southern conserva-
tive whom Washington himself had persuaded President Theo-
dore Roosevelt to appoint, would be favorable. But he was not, 
and Washington pressed Giles to the U.S. Supreme Court. Giles 
reveals Washington, not as the well-known accommodationist, 
and not even merely as an ironic example of DuBois' "double 
consciousness,"42 but as living out a split life in a way not un-
common for other black figures before the modem civil-rights 
43 
era. 
III 
Holmes' opinion for the 6-3 divided Court displays a similar 
dual personality. Exclusion from the canon cannot be reasons 
for reasons of length, for Holmes briskly dismissed the case in a 
terse eleven paragraphs. Giles sought an injunction, on behalf of 
himself and more than 5,000 similarly situated black voters in 
Montgomery county, requiring that registration officials enroll 
him and all other qualified black voters. With typical perverse 
delight, Holmes stared these claims in their face and re-
presented them starkly: "The white men generally are registered 
for good under the easy test and the black men are likely to be 
kept out in the future as in the past. This refusal to register the 
blacks was part of a general scheme to disfranchise them ... " 
Technical grounds might have enabled the Court to bypass the 
merits,44 but Holmes raced on to embrace an ultimate confronta-
42. At the very time Washington was secretly financing the Giles litigation, DuBois 
was leading the charge against Washington, devoting an entire chapter to a critique of 
Washington's advocacy of "submission and silence as to civil and political rights." 
W.E.B. Du-Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 36-51 (Penguin, 1989) (originally published 
1903). 
43. For an intriguing example from the literary world, see Henry Louis Gates, Jr., A 
Fragmented Man: George Schuyler and the Claims of Race, N.Y. Times, Book Review p. 
31 (Sept. 20, 1992). 
44. Before reaching the merits, Holmes found the claim was not moot, that the 
complaint did allege the requisite amount in controversy (then $2,000), and that state 
constitutions were included in the relevant federal jurisdictional statutes despite the fact 
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tion, for in his words, "we are dealing with a new and extraordi-
nary situation, and we are unwilling to stop short of the final 
considerations which seem to us to dispose of the case." 
As the first such "final consideration," there then follows 
the most legally disingenuous analysis in the pages of the U.S. 
Reports. As Holmes noted, the complaint alleged that the 
"whole registration scheme of the Alabama constitution is a 
fraud upon the Constitution of the United States .... " But in 
that case, Holmes responded, "how can we make the court a 
party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and adding another 
voter to its fraudulent lists?" Anticipating Joseph Heller, 
Holmes concluded that the very wrong Giles complained of 
made impossible the relief he sought: "If we accept the plaintiff's 
allegations for the purposes of his case, he cannot complain." 
Did Holmes actually believe this? It seems unlikely. For in 
turning to its second "final" consideration, his opinion stun-
ningly shifts from tortured legalisms to brutal political "real-
isms." Holmes now suggests that, beneath the doctrinal resolu-
tion lurks the fear of Supreme Court impotence: any judicial 
order, says Holmes, "would be an empty form." Giles' com-
plaint, Holmes baldly states, is "that the great mass of the white 
population intends to keep the blacks from voting." But from 
this it follows, he asserts, that if "the conspiracy and the intent 
exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them." For a 
judicial order to be effective, the Court would have to "be pre-
pared to supervise the voting ... " In the early part of this cen-
tury, such a conception of the Court's reach was inconceivable, 
at least to the Justices involved.45 No doubt Holmes, in particu-
lar, viewed the complaint as an invitation for courts, in essence, 
tore-initiate Reconstruction, or perhaps even the Civil War. 
The Court transformed this resistance into the sweeping 
doctrinal principle that equity cannot enforce "political rights." 
Thus, Holmes concluded, relief "from a great political wrong, if 
done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the State itself, 
must be given by them or by the legislative and political depart-
ment of the United States." Holmes had every reason to know 
that those statutes refer only to acting under color of state "statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage." 
45. This is confirmed from outside the opinion itself by the unusual report, after the 
case was handed down, that an unnamed Justice had asserted "that the legitimate out-
come of the power (Giles asked the Court to assume] would be that the court of equity 
would take charge of the State government and administer it, which is an unheard of 
proposition." N.Y. Daily Tribune (April28, 1903). 
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this would not be forthcoming, given the political context at the 
time-indeed, it is the very fear or recognition that any Court 
order would not be supported by other branches of the national 
government that underlies the Court's own self-abnegation. Na-
tional political reaction to Southern disfranchisement was quiet 
for many reasons, including that the federal government was 
seeking to restrict suffrage in newly acquired territories, such as 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and territories it effectively 
controlled, such as Cuba46 (the constitutional struggle over U.S. 
expansion is another untold, closely related story in the conven-
tional canon47). 
Giles perhaps confirms the theory that "conformity of the 
law to the wishes of the dominant power in the community was 
the fundamental tenet of [Holmes'] legal theory."48 It supports 
David Luban's view that Holmes "view[ed] electoral majorities 
as unanswerable military victors[.]"49 And it might reflect a re-
signed moral relativism that some attribute to Holmes's experi-
ence fighting for the North in the Civil War, from which Holmes 
drew the lesson that "[d]eep-seated preferences [could] not be 
argued about,50 and that a judge must never "forget[] that what 
seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow 
men to be wrong. "51 
46. See Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy 80-91 (1987); see also 
Mcmillan, Constitutional Development in Alabama at 290-91 (cited in note 30). In high-
visibility public forums, the most prominent Reconstruction historian of the time, Co-
lumbia University's racist William A. Dunning, directly expressed this linkage between 
domestic and foreign policy regarding race and democracy. Arguing against Reconstruc-
tion and for the idea that post-slavery social order "must in essence express the same fact 
of racial inequality" as slavery itself, he wrote chillingly: "The progress in the acceptance 
of this idea in the North has measured the progress in the South of the undoing of recon-
struction. In view of the questions which have been raised by our lately established rela-
tions with other races, it seems most improbable that the historian will soon, or ever, 
have to record a reversal of the conditions which this process has established." William 
A. Dunning, The Undoing of Reconstruction, LXXXVIII, The Atlantic Monthly 437, 449 
(Oct. 1901). The editors of the Atlantic, in a tone somewhere between sardonic and 
ironic, remarked, "If the stronger and cleverer race is free to impose its will upon 'new-
caught, sullen peoples' on the other side of the globe, why not in South Carolina and 
Mississippi?" Id. at 435. The Republican Party, led by McKinley, who focused on the 
pursuit of material prosperity, including through Northern investments in the South, did 
not want that pursuit deterred by a focus on "Negro rights." 
47. See Sanford Levinson, 17 Const. Comm. 241 (2000). 
48. Gary J. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, Scholar, Judge 145 
(Twayne Pub., 1989). 
49. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 Duke 
L.J. 449,515 (1994). 
50. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40,41 (1918). 
51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law and the Court (1913), in Richard A. Posner, 
ed., The Essential Holmes 147 (U. of Chicago Press, 1992). See Eben Moglen, Holmes's 
Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2027, 2039-40, 2043-44 
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The constitutional legitimation of massive disfranchisement 
did not quite end with Giles v. Harris. For the committed Giles 
(and his sponsors), took at face value Holmes' intimation else-
where in the opinion that, while equity could not right political 
wrongs, damages might be available to individuals whose consti-
tutional rights had been violated. In response, Giles brought 
follow-up actions for both damages and mandamus. One can 
almost imagine the pleasure with which the Alabama Supreme 
Court, no doubt more than content to follow Holmes' lead, in-
voked his "logic" to toss aside these actions too: it held that (1) 
either Giles was right, which meant that the registrars had no 
federal constitutional authority to register him at all, in which 
case "their refusal to do so cannot be made the predicate for a 
recovery of damages against them;" or (2) the registrars did have 
such authority, in which case they had legal immunity for their 
decisions. In Giles v. Teasley, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that adequate and independent state-law grounds insu-
lated the Alabama Supreme Court decision from review. 
Giles also illustrates dialogic exchange between Court and 
Congress, although in a more perverse form than contemporary 
"constitutional conversationalists" have in mind. From 1869 to 
1900, the House of Representatives used its constitutional power 
under the "Qualifications Clause"52 to set aside election results 
in over 30 cases from Southern states in which the House Elec-
tions Committee concluded that black voters had been excluded 
due to fraud, violence, or intimidation.53 In some cases, the 
House not only voided the result and required a new election, 
but, as in an 1880 case from Mississippi, ordered a black candi-
date seated who, according to state officials, had been defeated 
by his white opponent. In the last 20 years of the 19th century, 
the House 26 times ordered Southern Republicans or Populist 
congressmen seated because they had lost elections due to 
fraud.54 Importantly, the House concluded that its constitutional 
powers allowed it to override state-law rulings on the operation 
and effect of state election laws. The grounds on which the 
(1995} (suggesting the unexamined importance of the Ovil War experience to the 
Court's social conceptions). 
52. U.S. Const., Art I,§ 5, cl. 1 provides: "Each House shall be the Judge of Elec-
tions, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." 
53. The information in this paragraph is drawn from the comprehensive and superb 
study in Stavis, 57 Miss. L.J. (cited in note 18). The cases overturning election results are 
collected id. at 627 n.156. 
54. Kousser, Southern Politics at 263 (cited in note 1) (including cases from 1880 to 
1901). 
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House acted included not just electoral fraud and violence-and 
not just violence at the actual polls, but a gre-election atmos-
phere of violence, terrorism, or intimidation -but also, impor-
tantly, that state laws such as registration statutes violated the 
Constitution. Applying these principles, the House overturned 
congressional elections in this period from Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
Florida, Louisiana. Thus, the House was aggressively wielding 
its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment throughout this 
period. As late as 1896, it remained virtually undisputed in the 
House that it had the power to conclude, in the context of judg-
ing contested elections, that state registration statutes were un-
constitutional. 56 
But by the mid-1890s, congressional enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment began to abate. Although the House still 
overturned individual election results from Southern states as 
late as 1900,57 by 1896 the House began making it clear that it 
would not act on challenges to the emerging disfranchising con-
stitutions.58 The "coup de grace"59 was Congress' decision-one 
month after Giles v. Teasley came down-in the 1904 election 
challenge in Dantzler v. Lever. With Congress now clearly 
forced to center stage by the Court's abdication in Giles, Con-
gress in its own disingenous act shuttled responsibility back to 
the Court. In the 1902 House elections, Asbury Lever had de-
feated Alexander Dantzler in South Carolina's Seventh District. 
Dantzler's challenge claimed Lever's victory was illegitimate be-
cause South Carolina's new disfranchising constitution violated 
the Reconstruction Act of 1868. He asserted that "thousands of 
colored voters" had been disfranchised under South Carolina's 
new constitution, in violation of both the 1868 Act and the fed-
55. This was particularly important in Louisiana, which was in a state of virtual 
Civil War from the 1870s until 1896, including the worst single-day massacre in Recon-
struction history, the Colfax courthouse slaughter, which produced the Supreme Court's 
notorious decision in United States v. Cruikslumk, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), in which the Court 
held the resulting criminal indictments unconstitutional on the ground that the federal 
government had no power to reach private racial violence. For a powerful account of 
these events, see Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction at 173-218 (cited in note 26). 
56. Stavis, 57 Miss. L.J. at 633 n.l76 (cited in note 18). 
57. ld. at 627 n.l56. 
58. This stance was of a piece with Congress' repeal of much of the Reconstruction 
legislation, which a committee report celebrated by stating: "[let] every trace of the re-
construction measures be wiped from the statute books; let the States of this great Union 
understand that the elections are in their own hands; and if there be fraud coercion or 
force used they will be the first to feel it." H.R. Rep. No.18, 53d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1893), 
quoted in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,335 (1941). 
59. Stavis, 57 Miss. L.J. at 637 (cited in note 18). 
310 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:295 
eral constitution. But in a firm volte face that relinquished all 
the powers the House had built up over the last 30 years, the 
House Committee on Elections confirmed Lever's victory. The 
Committee declined "to put on record its opinion" of Dantzler's 
constitutional claim: 
However desirable it may be for a legislative body to retain 
control of the decision as to the election and qualification of 
its members, it is quite certain that a legislative body is not the 
ideal body to pass judicially upon the constitutionality of the 
enactments of other bodies. We have in this country a proper 
forum for the decision of constitutional and other judicial 
questions. If any citizen of South Carolina who was entitled to 
vote under the constitution of that State in 1868 is now de-
prived by the provisions of the present constitution, he has the 
right to tender himself for registration and for voting, and in 
case his right is denied, to bring suit in a proper court for the 
purpose of enforcing his right or recovering damages for its 
denial. 
That suit can be carried by him, if necessary, to the Su-
preme Court of the United States. If the United States Su-
preme Court shall declare in such case that the "fundamental 
conditions" in the reconstruction acts were valid and constitu-
tional and that the State constitutions are in violation of those 
acts, and hence invalid and unconstitutional, every State will 
be compelled to immediately bow in submission to the deci-
sion. The decision of the Supreme Court would be binding 
and would be a positive declaration of the law of the land 
which could not be denied or challenged. 
On the contrary, the decision of the House of Representa-
tives upon this grave judicial question would not be consid-
ered as binding or effective in any case except the one acted 
upon or as a precedent for future action in the House itself.60 
Despite several efforts over the next decade, the House 
from Dantzler v. Lever on continued to claim that only the 
courts could resolve these issues.61 And, for black voters in the 
South, there the situation remained, more or less, until the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965. 
60. H.R. Rep. No. 58-1740, at 3 (1904). 
61. Stavis, 57 Miss. L.J. at 638-39 (cited in note 18). 
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IV 
Does Giles reflect the fact that "[l]aw stands impotent be-
fore history"62 -or merely the human tendency, from which 
judges are hardly immune, to find "reality" so refractory as to 
provide an excuse for not doing what little might be done? Cur-
rently it has become fashionable to downplay the effectiveness 
of government; not surprisingly, the courts have been swept into 
this trend. In the age of judicial minimalism, one hardly wants to 
be seen as a judicial romantic, and reasons surely abound for 
thinking Holmes' world-weary realism might have understood 
his context as well as any hindsight efforts. White-supremacy 
political entrepreneurs in the South shared Holmes' view of the 
force required to stop disfranchisement, for despite acknowl-
edging disfranchisement to be unconstitutional, they simply pro-
claimed "there aren't enough soldiers in the U.S. Army to make 
whites give up the vote."63 Around the time of Giles, even bas-
tions of "enlightened" opinion in New England, such as the At-
lantic Monthly, which announced itself supportive in principle of 
political equality for all races, proclaimed Reconstruction en-
franchisement of blacks as a "grave ... error" and "short cut to 
equality" that had bestowed "the sudden gift of the ballot to 
men wholly unprepared to use it wisely" and as a result had 
"proved disastrous."64 And when the situation finally began to 
change in 1965, it did indeed take the concerted action of Con-
gress, the President, and the federal courts-including sending 
federal officials into Southern counties to take over the regis-
tering of voters.65 Even nearly a century later, Holmes was not 
62. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States at 373 (cited in note 9). 
63. These are the 1898 dares of the leader of Wilmington, North Carolina's White 
Government League, as it pursued segregation and the disfranchisement that would soon 
follow via constitutional amendment in 1900 (quoted in Glenda E. Gilmore, Gender and 
Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in Nonh Carolina, 1896-1920 at 
121 (1996)). 
64. LXXXVIII, The Atlantic Monthly 433, 434, 436 (cited in note 46). Instead of 
nationally-compelled enfranchisement, the Atlantic encouraged trust in "the good sense 
of the South," agreed that disfranchisers were "doubtless right in believing that open, 
avowed suppression of the negro vote-if that vote is to be eliminated-is better for all 
concerned than a scheme of fraud and chicanery," and urged only that any franchise re-
strictions be applied equally to both races. Id. at 436. 
65. On the effectiveness of these officials between 1965-1970, see Davidson and 
Grofman, Quiet Revolution at 367-69 (cited in note 31) (in states with strong presence of 
such officials, Mississippi and Alabama, more than half the majority-black counties had 
majority-black registered electorates as early as 1967-68, while other southern states spe-
cially covered by the Voting Rights Act did not reach this marker until the mid-1980s-
compared to a baseline of zero such counties in 1965, on the eve of the Act). 
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far off the mark in envisioning a pervasive national presence in 
the South as the predicate to full black political participation. 
Still, there were dissenting voices, not just that of the great 
dissenter Justice Harlan, who indeed did so here again, but ones 
reflecting more widespread opinion. The New York Daily Trib-
une, in response to Giles, plaintively editorialized: 
Somewhere, somehow, there must be a way of passing on the 
constitutionality of State laws which plainly nullify the spirit 
of the federal Constitution, and it is no more an assumption of 
the administrative functions of a State government for the 
court to declare that State authorities cannot deprive negroes 
of a ballot on pretexts which do not exclude white men than it 
is for the court to overrule any other action of a State or its 
officers. 66 
We will never know whether a Supreme Court opinion up-
holding Giles' claims (or perhaps validating them without or-
dering specific relief) would have influenced the politics, culture, 
and psychology of key individual actors in specific states, 
whether or not such a decision would have been legally effective 
or influential over national politics. But historical moments are 
often more contingent than they look generations down the 
road; paths actually taken acquire an aura of inevitability about 
them. No issue in American history, perhaps, generates this 
false sense of determinism more than that of race. The post-
Civil War renewal in the South of total white political domina-
tion easily seems pre-ordained and unavoidable. The "realist" 
strands in Holmes' opinion encourage that view in justification 
of one of the worst moments in the Court's history. But the po-
litical culture of disfranchisement was more fluid and precarious, 
in some states even more than others, than it appears in hind-
sight, or perhaps appeared to Holmes. Social and political histo-
rians of racial orders consistently discover the contingent and 
dynamic processes behind the construction of racialized social 
and political regimes, processes in which individual actions, cul-
tural constraints, and institutionalized forms mutually influence 
and re-shape each other.67 This is more true of the constitutional 
66. N.Y. Daily Tribune (Apri129, 1903). 
67. For the post-Civil War American South, this point is developed powerfully in 
Frederick Cooper, Thomas C. Holt, and Rebecca J. Scott, Beyond Slavery: Explorations 
of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Post-EmiUicipation Societies Ch. 3 (U. of North Caro-
lina Press, 2000); see also Lee D. Baker, From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the 
Construction of Race, 1896-1954 (U. of California Press, 1998). For a few examples from 
other post-slavery racial orders, whose subsequent political and social systems developed 
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moment at which disfranchisement went to the Supreme Court 
than might be thought. For once the Supreme Court effectively 
blessed the disfranchising constitutions, those constitutions then 
created an electorate in their own image. One of the most ro-
bust observations political scientists have made is that electoral 
structures once put into place "tend to be very stable and to re-
sist change."68 The dramatically constricted electorates disfran-
chisement brought into being, with their ground rules and insti-
tutional structures locked into place at the constitutional level, 
managed to maintain control over southern politics, through the 
one-party Democratic monopoly, until national intervention 
forced these electoral ground rules to change in 1965. From that 
perspective, the triumph of disfranchisement, no matter what the 
Court had done in Giles, might well seem inevitable. 
But when we enter into the period, or descend from the 
Olympian heights from which Holmes seemed to have viewed 
events, disfranchisement was hardly foreordained, nor is it clear 
that Supreme Court resistance to it would have had no effect. 
For one, the South was not monolithic; in Maryland, for exam-
ple, disfranchisement failed, and even where it succeeded, in 
places like North Carolina, politics was not necessarily the same 
as in Mississippi or Alabama. In assessing Giles, we might there-
fore ask not whether a contrary Supreme Court decision would 
have stopped disfranchisement everywhere, but whether it might 
have made a difference somewhere, such as states like North 
Carolina. There whites were deeply divided over disfranchise-
ment; when the disfranchising constitution of 1900-just before 
Giles-was submitted for popular approval, it passed with only 
58.6% of the vote, with black voters almost totally excluded 
from the polls by violence and intimidation.69 Moreover, part of 
quite differently from that in the U.S. South, of the role of choice and contingency in the 
construction of racial orders, see generally Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, 
and Revolution, 1868-I898 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1999) and Thomas C. Holt, The 
Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938 (Johns 
Hopkins U. Press, 1992). In general, scholars of social movements also consistently em· 
phasize how much specific moments of political vulnerability, and their successful exploi-
tation or avoidance, influence success or failure of such movements. See, e.g., Sidney 
Tarrow, Power In Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Mass Politics In 
The Modern State (Cambridge U. Press, 1994); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolu-
tions (Cambridge U. Press, 1979); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution 
(Addison-Wesley, 1978); Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930-1970 (U. of Chicago Press, 1982). 
68. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Govern-
ment in Twenty-One Countries 52 (Yale U. Press, 1994). 
69. For the statistics, see Allison v. Sharp, 184 S.E. 27, 30 (N.C. 1936); Kousser, 
Southern Politics at 193 (cited in note 1). 
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what also comes as a surprise to many about this entire era is the 
robust, interracial political coalitions that flourished in some 
places for a period, and North Carolina affords an important ex-
ample. Far from white toleration of black political participation 
being inconceivable, it was the very success of interracial politi-
cal coalitions that catalyzed the disfranchisement movement 
among the previously ruling white elite.70 In North Carolina, a 
fusion coalition of Republicans and Populists, with black and 
white political support, controlled the state legislature as late as 
1894-1898. In 1896, numerous blacks were being elected to local 
offices, such as justices of the peace, school committeemen, al-
dermen, county commissioners, constables, register of deeds, 
and a city attomey.71 North Carolina had a well-educated, 
thriving black middle-class on the eve of disfranchisement; yet as 
a leading historian puts it, "[w]ithin a decade, the white suprem-
acy campaign and disfranchisement had erased the image of the 
black middle class from the minds of white North Carolinians."72 
Thus it is no wonder that we have little recognition of the politi-
cal possibilities that were being realized in places like North 
Carolina just before disfranchisement. Indeed, the disfran-
chisement movement should be seen as testimony to this very 
fact; it was propelled by the aim of the Democratic Party to re-
seize control of state politics and to destroy the conditions that 
had made for partisan competition and greater participation by 
poor and uneducated whites as well as blacks. It is for this rea-
son that disfranchisement was resisted by so many white voters 
and that the constitution barely passed in an effectively all-white 
electorate. The Democratic Party, the organized vehicle of 
white supremacy, regained control of the legislature and gover-
nor's office by framing politics around issues of race rather than 
economics or class. Rhetorically equating fusion rule with black 
political power, and with black rape of white women ("not one 
of our fair women has even been assaulted in this land but that 
the infamous act may be traced to the Fifteenth Amendment"),73 
the Democratic Party sought to make its dominance enduring 
70. See, e.g., Kousser, Southern Politics at 183 (cited in note 1) (until 1898, "[t]he 
North Carolina political system was perhaps the most democratic in the late nineteenth-
century South."). 
71. Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow at 78 (cited in note 63). 
72. Id. at 143. 
73. This is from the Alabama Constitutional Convention, but similar statements 
were widespread across Southern disfranchising states. Mcmillan, Constitutional Devel-
opment in Alabama at 292 (cited in note 30) (quoting the Chairman of the Suffrage 
Committee, from the Official Proceedings of the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Conven-
tion); see Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow at 85, 97 (cited in note 63). 
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through constitutional revision. Thus, a few years before dis-
franchisement, North Carolina experienced robust interracial 
parties and politics; disfranchisement itself barely succeeded. 
Given how fluid politics was in this period, would nothing have 
changed in the fragile political dynamics of North Carolina had 
the Supreme Court found disfranchisement a blatant constitu-
tional violation? Once enacted, the North Carolina literacy test 
endured; it survived later constitutional challenges in the state 
supreme court in 193674 (actually, was affirmatively celebrated 
there) and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1959,75 before the Voting 
Rights Act eventually eliminated it. 
In assessing Giles, therefore, one must ask whether Holmes 
was as "realistic" about North Carolina as he perhaps was about 
Alabama, Giles's home state. But now here is the rub: Alabama 
was not Alabama either. For white Alabama, too, was not a 
monolithic state determined to destroy the Fifteenth Amend-
ment at all costs, no matter what the Supreme Court did. Far 
from it: The Alabama Constitution of 1901 that Giles challenged 
might well not even have been approved in the referendum that 
nominally endorsed it. Like many Southern states, Alabama's 
politics were sharply divided between Black-Belt counties, 
where blacks constituted a large part or majority of the popula-
tion, and the "hill counties," areas with few blacks, never suited 
for plantation economies, often mountainous and made up of 
small farmers. Much of Alabama's history consisted of struggles 
for political domination between northern Alabama and the 
74. See Allison v. Sharp, 184 S.E. 27, 30 (N.C. 1936). Citing statistics on black and 
white educational systems, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered that it "would 
not be amiss to say that this constitutional amendment providing for an educational 
test ... brought light out of darkness as to education for all the people of the state. Re-
ligious, educational, and material uplift went forward by leaps and bounds." Some histo-
rians argue that this statement is not as fatuous as one might think; on this interpretation, 
the white supremacist Democratic Governor during disfranchisement, Charles Aycock, 
saw universal education as "the South's salvation" and successfully used the test's exis-
tence to press for greater public investment in education, including in black schools, 
though of course not in equal proportion. Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and 
the Politics of White Supremacy in Nonh Carolina, 1896-1920 at 121-22,158 (cited in note 
63). Other historians, relying on detailed quantitative analysis, argue that while the ab-
solute levels of public educational expenditures increased dramatically, there was a sub-
stantial increase in the relative inequality between blacks and whites in public burdens 
and benefits, including education, after disfranchisement in North Carolina. See J. 
Morgan Kousser, Progressivism-For Middle-Class Whites Only: North Carolina Educa-
tion, 1880-1910, XLVI J. So. Hist. 169, 191-92 (1980) ("Most strikingly, blacks suffered 
much more discrimination after than before disfranchisement and the establishment of 
the one-party system, particularly in the heavily black areas where before 1900 their 
votes had bought a disproportionately high level of services."). 
75. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
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Black-Belt counties in south central Alabama.76 The disfran-
chising constitution was approved with only 57% of the vote (a 
margin of 26,879 votes~, and the total vote was against it in 54 of 
the state's 66 counties. As in most southern states, the constitu-
tion was a product, not of a united white majority, but of a fac-
tion of conservative Democratic Party elites; they were resisted 
tooth and nail by Republicans, remaining Populists, and Demo-
crats who favored more popular control over politics. The con-
stitution prevailed because it was approved 36,224 to 5,471 in 12 
late-reporting Black-Belt counties; yet in some of these counties, 
there were three times as many votes for the constitution as 
white men eligible to vote. As the leading study of this referen-
dum concludes, unless blacks voted overwhelmingly to disfran-
chise themselves, these counties almost certainly engaged in the 
familiar practice of "counting in" the black vote: "almost every 
eligible NeRro was 'voted' although thousands never appeared at 
the polls." Holmes, confident he understood the ways of the 
world even in his first few months on the Court, was simply 
wrong that the Alabama Constitution of 1901 reflected the fact, 
let alone the unalterable fact, that "the great mass of the white 
population intends to keep the blacks from voting." Whether 
that was so or not, the constitution Holmes was asked to judge 
hardly provided conclusive evidence of that "realistic" fact. 
One should be neither naive nor anachronistic, of course, 
about the Court's power.79 But once again, when we enter this 
76. See Thornton, Politics and Power at 27,40-41 (cited in note 35). 
77. The information in this paragraph comes from Mcmillan, Constitutional Devel-
opment in Alabama at 350-52 (cited in note 30). 
78. Id. at 351. 
79. In a major study of the Supreme Court during the era of segregation and dis-
franchisement, Michael Klarman argues both that "it may be implausible to think that 
the Justices realistically could have reached different results in cases [like Giles]," given 
dominant public opinion and racial attitudes, and that even had the Court come out dif-
ferently, "it remains unlikely that much would have changed in practice for Southern 
blacks." Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 S. a. Rev. 303,303, 414; see generally 
Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 881 
(1998). I cannot here give an adequate response to Klarman's detailed and important 
corrective to overly simplistic condemnation of the Court; in any event, for many pur-
poses, I consider discussion of the issues Giles raises more important than counterfactual 
analysis of whether a contrary decision would or would not have "mattered." But I do 
think Klarman writes about "public opinion" at a more general, distant, and universal 
level than many of the cultural and political historians who have studied the construction 
of racial identity and politics, in the Ples:;y-era South as well as elsewhere. See, e.g., su-
pra notes 1, 16, 18, 22, 26, 28, 55, 63, 67. In general, these works suggest to me that public 
opinion, on race as on other matters, is rarely uniform among a monolithic white major-
ity; that public opinion is typically malleable to a surprising extent and is often manipu-
lated by political actors for various purposes, particularly partisan ones, as public-opinion 
scholars consistently document, see, e.g., Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Di-
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period enough to recognize how fluid it was, and how divided 
even the white electorate was, it is hard to be as complacent as 
Justice Holmes about how little cultural effect, in some places at 
least, a Supreme Court decision condemning disfranchisement 
might have had. Moreover, from the perspective of the Court 
itself, Justice Frankfurter, an heir to Holmes in more than just 
Holmes' formal seat, long argued that the Court's legitimacy 
would be compromised should it enter "the political thicket" and 
decide cases involving systemic political claims. Yet when the 
Court did so in Baker v. Carr, over Frankfurter's vehement ob-
jections, its one-vote, one-person decisions requiring the restruc-
turing of nearly every state legislature in the country seemed to 
enhance, not compromise, the Court's stature. 
v 
Giles is probably the most momentous ignored decision in 
the history of the Supreme Court. Even within the specific con-
fines of the disfranchisement struggle, Giles not only opens a 
constitutional window into this too little understood period of 
American law and history. For Giles also poses in their most 
primordial form questions of the relationship among law, poli-
tics, and culture, as well as the relationship of national to state 
power in the fundamental sphere of democracy itself. The deci-
sion also provides perspective on how much different the Court's 
proclaimed self-conception of the nature and effectiveness of ju-
dicial power was in the pre-Brown era. For some, this will per-
haps reveal little more than judicial hypocrisy, for the Giles era 
vided By Color (V. of Chicago Press, 1996); that institutions and laws matter in shaping 
politics and cultures at least as much as purportedly pre-existent and fixed cultural atti· 
tudes; that to the Southern elite in control of disfranchisement, it certainly mattered that 
they achieve domination within legally accepted forms; and that given the fluidity of cul-
tural constructions of race and the key role of institutions and laws, the processes de-
scribed here were far more contingent than more deterministic analysis suggests, and that 
interventions of one sort or another, including Supreme Court decisions, can influence 
subsequent events both legally and culturally-in some places more than others, at some 
times more than others-more than may be readily apparent from too distant a perspec-
tive. Even at the start of the Ovil War, it might well have seemed inconceivable that na-
tional policy would soon require uncompensated emancipation of all slaves in the Con-
federate States; but as at least a decade of scholarship now shows, dynamic social 
processes the War unleashed, particularly the actions of slaves, such as fleeing to Union 
troop lines, consistently created new pressures and demands that altered the context and 
made implausible any settlement short of universal abolition-no matter how resolute 
public opinion and national policy might have seemed against that outcome a mere four 
years earlier. For a brief summary of this voluminous work, see generally Ira Berlin, et. 
a!., Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War (Cambridge U. 
Press, 1992). 
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was after all also the era of Lochner, the Court majority surely 
had no difficulty in regularly striking down majoritarian regula-
tion of wages, hours, and conditions of work, even if those deci-
sions provoked dissents from Holmes himself. But for others, 
the nature of the political stakes in Giles, and the kind of active 
judicial monitoring and oversight of ongoing state electoral prac-
tices that a favorable ruling might have required, could justify a 
judicial view that Giles posed a singularly formidable chal-
lenge-even if post-Brown courts would be relatively more as-
sured about their capacity to respond. Conflicts between capital 
and labor, in the United States at least, have never produced a 
Civil War. 
But beyond the immediate issues surrounding disfranchise-
ment, Giles also played a broader role in constructing the cate-
gory of "political rights" and locating it beyond the reach of con-
stitutional law. As Justice Frankfurter's invocation of Giles 
shows almost half a century later, to deny judicial power to ad-
dress grossl~ malapportioned Congressional districts and state 
legislatures, Giles had doctrinal and institutional ramifications 
even beyond the profound issue of black disfranchisement. 
From Holmes to Frankfurter and beyond, Giles reflected and 
shaped a constitutional culture in which the large issues of 
democratic governance and institutional structure were, like un-
known territories on a medieval map, cast as threatening mon-
sters and placed outside the known domains of constitutional 
law.81 
80. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
81. For reliance upon Giles in the state courts, see, e.g., State v. Albritton, 37 So.2d 
640 (Ala. 1948} (holding that courts of equity have no power to intervene in political af-
fairs); Boswell v. Bethea, 5 So. 2d 816 (Ala. 1942) (refusing to review claim of racially dis-
criminatory voter registration); Wilkinson v. Henry, 128 So. 362 (Ala. 1930) (holding that 
party rules regulating participation in primaries are not justiciable); Walls v. Brundidge, 
160 S.W. 230, 232 (Ark. 1913) (holding challenge non-justiciable to claims of fraud in 
Democratic primary because rights involving voting were are political rights}. For simi-
lar reliance in the federal courts, see Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295, 301 (W.D. Ark. 
1948) ("In the light of the language of the Supreme Court which we have heretofore 
quoted from its opinion in Colegrove v. Green ... it certainly cannot be said that that 
Court, by whose decisions we are of course bound, has in any sense strayed from the rule 
announced by it in Giles v. Harris .. . forty-five years ago.") (denying jurisdiction in eq-
uity for claim that defendants and thousands of others had their poll taxes unlawfully 
paid and thereby unlawfully obtained receipts for poll taxes enabling them to vote in 
primary election); Blackman v. Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Ill. 1936}, vacated ~or moot-
ness 300 U.S. 641 (1937} (denying jurisdiction for suit seeking to have certam names 
placed on ballot for state-wide elections); Grigsby v.J!arr~, 27 F.~d 9~~ (S.D. Tex. 1~28) 
(Democratic Party's exclusion of black voters from pnmanes non-Justlcable under Giles) 
(effectively reversed in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)). 
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Baker v. Carr began to change that, but not as much as 
some might think. Doctrinally, courts have indeed entered the 
political thicket and found the Constitution to invalidate par-
ticular means by which politically dominant actors have tried to 
"lock up" political institutions through techniques analogous to 
those used in the era of disfranchisement.82 But even so, Giles 
has continued to exert unrecognized gravitational pull over cur-
rent doctrine. For Giles had established, and Colegrove had con-
firmed, that courts would not address systemic political wrongs. 
In part to avoid these principles, the Court in the Baker v. Carr 
era therefore channeled such claims into an individual rights 
framework, where they could be addressed through conventional 
rights-oriented constitutional doctrine.83 But forcing questions 
about the systemic organization of democratic politics into this 
rights model has encouraged the Court to fail to engage the in-
evitably systemic nature of these issues.84 
Moreover, judicial application of constitutional law to issues 
of democratic political organization has been tentative, hesitant, 
erratic, and lacking in sustained commitment or conviction.85 
That this reflects, in part, the longer constitutional tradition in 
which issues of democratic governance were off the map alto-
gether seems likely. Even today, the canon of constitutional law 
barely touches upon issues of democratic governance, let alone 
giving those issues the systematic, sustained, and central atten-
tion they require. Giles itself, as I documented at the outset, re-
mains largely obscure. Recovering the history of constitutional 
law's relationship to America's long running anti-democratic 
structures before the Voting Rights Act is one way of beginning 
to place democracy front and center in constitutional law and 
thought. The kind of democracy we experience is not the pure 
distillation of organic cultural and political forces. Democratic 
experience is a product, in part at least, of the institutional struc-
tures and legal rule-structure, including constitutional law, that 
can constrain or liberate the kind of democracy we have. 
82. See generally Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: 
Panisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643 (1998) and the articles 
discussing the problem and theory of political lockups in the Virginia Law Review Sym-
posium entitled The Law and Economics of Elections, 85 U. Va. L. Rev. 1533, 1533-1812 
(1999). 
83. I am indebted to Sam Issacharoff for this provocative insight, which I credit to 
him in the event that further reflection leads me to conclude it is wrong. 
84. For elaboration, see Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 
U. Va. L. Rev. 1605 (1999). 
85. For more on this indictment, see generally Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. 
Pildes, Not By "Election Law" Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1173 (1999). 
